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Abstract
It has long been recognized that there is considerable heterogeneity in individual risk
taking behavior but little is known about the distribution of risk taking types. We present
a parsimonious characterization of risk taking behavior by estimating a finite mixture
regression model for three different experimental data sets, two Swiss and one Chinese,
over a large number of real gains and losses. We find two distinct types of individuals:
In all three data sets, the choices of roughly 80% of the subjects exhibit significant
deviations from rational probability weighting consistent with prospect theory. 20%
of the subjects weight probabilities linearly and behave essentially as expected value
maximizers. Moreover, the individuals are assigned to one of these two groups with
probabilities of close to one resulting in a low measure of entropy. The reliability and
robustness of our classification suggest using a mix of preference theories in applied
economic modeling.
KEYWORDS: Individual Risk Taking Behavior, Latent Heterogeneity, Finite Mixture
Regression Models
JEL CLASSIFICATION: D81, C49
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1 Introduction
Risk is a ubiquitous feature of social and economic life. Many of our everyday choices, and
often the most important ones, such as what trade to learn and where to live, involve risky
consequences. While it has long been recognized that individuals differ in their risk taking
attitudes, surprisingly little is known about the distribution of risk preferences in the pop-
ulation (for an exception see Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, Sunde, Schupp, and Wagner (2005)).
Since preferences are one of the ultimate drivers of behavior, knowledge of the composition
of risk attitudes is paramount to predicting economic behavior. Economic models often allow
for heterogeneity, but this heterogeneity is usually confined to remain within the boundaries
of the standard model of preferences, expected utility theory (EUT). The empirical evidence,
however, reveals that heterogeneity in risk taking behavior is of a substantive kind, i.e. some
people evaluate risky prospects consistently with EUT, whereas other people deviate substan-
tially from expected utility maximization (Hey and Orme, 1994). Moreover, it seems to be the
case that rational decision makers revealing EUT-preferences constitute only a minority of the
population. To improve descriptive performance a plethora of alternative theories have been
developed (for an overview see Starmer (2000)). Unfortunately, no single best fitting model
has been identified so far (Harless and Camerer, 1994) and, depending on the individual, one
or the other model fits better. This finding poses a serious problem for applied economics.
What the modeler needs is a parsimonious representation of risk preferences which is empir-
ically well grounded and robust, and not a host of different functionals. Providing such a
parsimonious characterization of heterogeneity in risk taking behavior is the objective of this
paper.
Our method is based on a literature on classifying individuals which has recently emerged in
the social sciences. On the basis of statistical classification procedures, such as finite mixture
regression models, investigators have tried to discover which decision rules people actually
use when playing games or dealing with complex decision situations (El-Gamal and Grether,
1995; Houser, Keane, and McCabe, 2004). The finite mixture regression approach does not
require fitting a model for each individual which is - given the usual quality of the choice data
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- frequently impossible. Instead, our approach reveals latent heterogeneity by estimating the
relative sizes of distinct behavioral groups and by endogenously assigning each individual to
a specific group characterized by a unique set of parameter values.
We apply such a finite mixture regression model to choice data from three different exper-
iments, two of which were conducted in Zurich, Switzerland. The third experiment took place
in Beijing, People’s Republic of China. We analyze 452 subjects’ decisions over real monetary
gains and losses, which comprise a total of about 18,000 choices. All three experiments were
designed in a similar manner and served to elicit certainty equivalents for binary lotteries.
Using a flexible sign-dependent functional as basic behavioral model, we show the following
results.
First, in all three data sets, we find two distinct behavioral types of risk taking behavior.
Second, the ratios of the different types in their respective populations are practically equal
in both the Swiss and the Chinese data sets and amount to roughly 20:80. Third, without
putting any a priori restrictions on parameter values we find that one of the two types, which
comprises about 20% of the individuals in each data set, exhibits near linear probability
weighting functions and value functions. Therefore, this group can essentially be characterized
as expected value maximizers. This result is particularly interesting in the light of Rabin’s
calibration theorem (Rabin, 2000) which shows that expected utility maximizers should be
approximately risk neutral for small stakes typically encountered in laboratory experiments.
Therefore, we label subjects belonging to this group of risk neutral people as “EUT-types”.
Fourth, in each data set, the second group, which comprises about 80% of the individuals,
is characterized by significant deviations from linear probability weighting and can be con-
veniently described as prospect theory types. Fifth, almost all the experimental subjects are
unambiguously assigned to one of the two distinct types. Measuring the quality of classifica-
tion by the average normalized entropy (El-Gamal and Grether, 1995) we obtain an extent
of ambiguous assignments of less than 5% of the maximum entropy, a value which is, to our
knowledge, unequaled in the literature. Thus, we observe almost no “ambiguous” types, i.e.
individuals that are assigned a high probability (of say 0.4) of being one type and a high
probability (of say 0.6) of being another type are practically absent. This clean classifica-
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tion suggests that the procedure is able to capture an essential manifestation of individual
heterogeneity.
Finally, for all three prospect theory groups we obtain similar parameter values for the
probability weighting function and the value function over losses, indicating a considerable
cross-cultural stability of preference parameters. For decisions over gains, however, Chinese
behavior differs substantially from Swiss behavior. Overweighting of probabilities is more
pronounced and the sensitivity to changes in probabilities is considerably lower for Chinese
subjects. Moreover, the Chinese value function is clearly concave, whereas the corresponding
Swiss ones are close to linearity. The total effect of both components render the Chinese
relatively more risk seeking for gains over a considerable range of probabilities. Thus, the
finite mixture regression helps to better understand the nature of cross-cultural differences.
These results show that the classification procedure successfully uncovers latent hetero-
geneity in the population. If there is heterogeneity of a substantive kind, as the data suggest,
basing predictions on a single preference theory is inappropriate and may lead to biased re-
sults. EUT preferences should be taken account of alongside prospect theory preferences even
if rational behavior constitutes only a minority in the population. As the literature on the
role of bounded rationality under strategic complementarity and substitutability has shown
(Haltiwanger and Waldman, 1985, 1989; Fehr and Tyran, 2005; Camerer and Fehr, 2006), the
mix of rational and irrational actors may be decisive for aggregate outcomes. Depending on
the nature of the strategic interdependence even a minority of players of a particular type
may determine the aggregate outcome. Therefore, the mix of types in the population is a
crucial variable in predicting market outcomes. Since the finite mixture regression provides a
robust and reliable classification of the individuals estimates of group sizes and group-specific
parameters may serve as a valuable inputs for applied economics.
To the best of our knowledge, there is no study showing a nearly identical classification
of risk preference types for three independent data sets. Related work by Harrison and Rut-
stroem (2006) and Harrison, Humphrey, and Verschoor (2005) also applies a finite mixture
regression model to several experimental data sets but decisively distinguishes itself from our
analysis. Their estimation procedure classifies choices assuming one type to be expected util-
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ity maximizing. In contrast, our estimation procedure assigns subjects endogenously to one
of two distinct types, one of which turns out to be consistent with EUT-preferences. Thus,
our results can be viewed as stronger evidence in favor of a non-negligible share of EUT indi-
viduals. In addition, our results show one feature which renders our classification particularly
convincing: Almost all individuals are assigned with a probability close to one to one of the
two endogenously emerging preference types.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design for the
three experiments. The functional specification of the behavioral model and the finite mixture
regression model are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 presents descriptive statistics of the
data and the results of the classification procedure. Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
In the following section we describe the experimental setup and procedures. The experiments
took place in Zurich in 2003 and 2006 as well as in Beijing in 2005. In Zurich, all subjects were
recruited from the subject pool of the Institute of Empirical Research in Economics which
contains students of all fields of the University of Zurich and the Swiss Federal Institute of
Technology Zurich. In Beijing, subjects were recruited by flyer distributed at the campus of
Peking University. Since all three experiments are based on the same design principles, we
will present the prototype experiment Zurich 2003 in detail (Fehr-Duda, de Gennaro, and
Schubert, 2006) and describe to what extent the other two experiments deviate from the
prototype. The main distinguishing features of the different experiments are summarized in
Table 1.
We elicited certainty equivalents for a large number of two-outcome lotteries. One half
of the lotteries was framed as choices between risky and certain gains (“gain domain”). The
remaining decisions were presented as choices between risky and certain losses (“loss domain”).
For each lottery in the loss domain, subjects were endowed with a specific cash amount which
served to cover their potential losses and which rendered the expected payoff for the loss lottery
equal to the expected payoff of an equivalent gain lottery. In the Zurich 2003 and the Beijing
4
Table 1: Differences in Experimental Design
Zurich 03 Zurich 06 Beijing 05
Number of:
Subjects 181 118 153
Lotteries 50 40 28
Observations 9,005 4,669 4,281
Procedure computerized computerized paper and pencil
Framing abstract and contextual abstract and
contextual contextual
experiments, 50% of the subjects were confronted with decisions framed in the standard gamble
format, the other 50% of the subjects had to make choices framed in contextual terms, i.e.
gains were represented as risky or sure investment gains, losses as repair costs and insurance
premiums, respectively1. The Zurich 2006 experiment was based on contextual lotteries only.
Outcomes x1 and x2 ranged from zero Swiss Francs to 150 Swiss Francs
2. The payoffs in the
Beijing 2005 experiment were commensurate with the compensation in Zurich and amounted
to 4 to 55 Chinese Yuan. Probabilities p of the lotteries’ higher gain or loss, x1, varied from
5% to 95%. The gain lotteries for Zurich 2003 are presented in Table 2. The other two
experiments essentially included a subset of the Zurich 2003 lotteries. The expected payoff
per subject amounted to approximately 31 Swiss Francs and 20 Chinese Yuan, respectively,
which was considerably more than a local student assistant’s hourly compensation, plus a
show up fee of 10 Swiss Francs and 20 Chinese Yuan, thus generating salient incentives. The
lotteries appeared in random order on a computer screen3, in Beijing on paper.
For each lottery, the screen displayed a decision sheet containing the specifics of the lottery
1Pooling the data of both treatments does not change the results of our analysis.
2At the time of the Zurich 2003 experiment one Swiss Franc equaled about 0.80 U.S. Dollars.
3The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, forthcoming).
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Table 2: Gain Lotteries (x1, p;x2)
p x1 x2 p x1 x2 p x1 x2
0.05 20 0 0.25 50 20 0.75 50 20
0.05 40 10 0.50 10 0 0.90 10 0
0.05 50 20 0.50 20 10 0.90 20 10
0.05 150 50 0.50 40 10 0.90 50 0
0.10 10 0 0.50 50 0 0.95 20 0
0.10 20 10 0.50 50 20 0.95 40 10
0.10 50 0 0.50 150 0 0.95 50 20
0.25 20 0 0.75 20 0
0.25 40 10 0.75 40 10
Outcomes x1 and x2 are denominated in Swiss Francs.
Figure 1: Design of the Decision Sheet
Decision situation:
22
Guaranteed payoff amounting to:
1 A o B
2 A o B
3 A o B
4 A o B
5 A o B
6 A o B
7 A o B
8 A o B
9 A o B
10 A o B
11 A o B
12 A o B
13 A o B
14 A o B
15 A o B
16 A o B
17 A o B
18 A o B
19 A o B
20 A o B 1
15
14
13
12
OK
20
19
Option B
7
6
5
4
3
2
Option A Your Choice:
A profit of CHF 20 with 
probability 75%             
and a profit of CHF 0 with 
probability 25% 
11
10
9
8
18
17
16
28
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and a list of 20 equally spaced certain outcomes ranging from the lottery’s maximum payoff to
the lottery’s minimum payoff as shown in Figure 1. The subjects had to indicate whether they
preferred the lottery or the certain payoff for each line of the decision sheet. The lottery’s
certainty equivalent was calculated as the arithmetic mean of the smallest certain amount
preferred to the lottery and the following certain amount on the list when the subject had for
the first time reported preference for the lottery. For example, if the subject had decided as
indicated by the small circles in Figure 1 her certainty equivalent would amount to 13.5 Swiss
Francs.
Before the subjects were permitted to start working on the experimental decisions they
had to correctly calculate the payoffs for two hypothetical choices. In the computerized
experiments, there were two trial rounds to familiarize the subjects with the procedure. At
the end of the experiment, one of their choices was randomly selected for payment. Subjects
were paid in private afterward. The subjects could work at their own speed, the vast majority
of them needed less than an hour to complete the experiment.
3 Econometric Model
This section discusses the specification of the finite mixture regression model which allows
controlling for latent heterogeneity in risk taking behavior in a parsimonious way. Estimating
the finite mixture model yields the relative sizes of a pre-specified number of groups and the
group-specific parameters of the underlying behavioral model. Moreover, as we use the Expec-
tation Maximization algorithm (Dempster, Laird, and Rubin, 1977) to compute the maximum
likelihood estimates of the model parameters we obtain Bayesian updates for the probabili-
ties of individual group membership. This procedure allows us to assign each individual to a
specific group.
For our purposes of classifying subjects according to risk taking type we need to specify
three ingredients of the mixture model: the basic theory of decision under risk, the functional
form of the decision model, and the specification of the error term.
The underlying theory of decision under risk should be able to accommodate a wide range
7
of different behaviors. Sign- and rank-dependent models, such as cumulative prospect theory
(CPT), capture two robust empirical phenomena: nonlinear probability weighting and loss
aversion (Starmer, 2000). Therefore, a flexible approach, such as proposed by CPT, lends
itself to describing risk taking behavior4. Moreover, CPT nests EUT as special case. If there
is a group of people whose behavior can be described by EUT rather than by a non-degenerate
version of CPT, these individuals should be identified by the finite mixture regression.
Suppose that there are C different types of individuals in the population. According to
CPT, an individual belonging to a certain group c ∈ {1, . . . , C} values any binary gamble
Gg = (x1g, pg;x2g), g ∈ {1, . . . , G}, where |x1g| > |x2g|, by
v (Gg) = v(x1g)w(pg) + v(x2g)(1− w(pg)).
The function v(x) describes how monetary outcomes, x, are valued, whereas the function w(p)
assigns a subjective weight to every outcome probability, p. The gamble’s certainty equivalent
cˆeg can then be written as
cˆeg = v
−1 [v(x1g)w(pg) + v(x2g)(1− w(pg))] .
In order to make CPT operational, we have to assume specific functional forms for the
value function v(x) and the probability weighting function w(p). A natural candidate for v(x)
is a sign-dependent power functional
v(x) =
 xα if x ≥ 0−(−x)β otherwise,
which can be conveniently interpreted and has turned out to be the best compromise between
parsimony and goodness of fit in the context of prospect theory (Stott, 2006). The curvature
parameters are identifiable since our experimental design contains lotteries with both outcomes
being nonzero.
A variety of functionals for modeling probability weights w(p) have been proposed in the
literature (Quiggin, 1982; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992; Prelec, 1998). We use the two-
parameter specification suggested by Goldstein and Einhorn (1987) and Lattimore, Baker,
4In the case of binary lotteries, CPT reduces to the original version of prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979).
8
and Witte (1992):
w(p) =
δpγ
δpγ + (1− p)γ , δ ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0.
We favor this specification because it has proven to account well for individual heterogeneity
(Wu, Zhang, and Gonzalez, 2004). The parameter γ largely governs the slope of the curve,
whereas the parameter δ largely governs its elevation. The smaller the value of γ, the more
strongly the probability weighting function deviates from linear weighting. The larger the
value of δ, the more elevated the curve, ceteris paribus. Linear weighting is characterized by
γ = δ = 1. In a sign-dependent model, the parameters may take on different values for gains
and for losses.
We now turn to the third step of model specification. In the course of the experiments,
we measured risk taking behavior of individual i ∈ {1, . . . , N} by her certainty equivalents
ceig for a set of different lotteries. Since CPT explains deterministic choice we have to add an
error term, ig, in order to estimate the parameters of the model based on the elicited certainty
equivalents. The observed certainty equivalent ceig can then be written as ceig = cˆeg + ig.
There may be different sources of error, such as carelessness, hurry or inattentiveness, resulting
in accidentally wrong answers (Hey and Orme, 1994). The Central Limit Theorem supports
the assumption that the errors are normally distributed and simply add white noise.
Furthermore, we allow for three different sources of heteroscedasticity in the error variance.
First, for each lottery the subjects have to consider 20 certain outcomes which are equally
spaced throughout the lottery’s range, |x1g−x2g|. Since the observed certainty equivalent, ceig,
is calculated as the arithmetic mean of the smallest certain amount preferred to the lottery
and the following certain amount where the lottery is preferred, the error is proportional to
the range of the considered lottery. Second, as the subjects are heterogeneous with respect
to their previous knowledge, their ability of finding the correct certainty equivalent as well as
their attention span we expect the error variance to differ by individual. Third, lotteries in
the gain domain may be judged differently from the ones in the loss domain. Therefore we
allow for domain-specific variance in the error term. This yields the form σig = ξi|x1g−x2g| for
the standard deviation of the error term distribution, where ξi denotes an individual domain-
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specific parameter. Note that the model allows to test for both individual-specific and domain-
specific heteroscedasticity by either imposing the restriction ξi = ξ, or by forcing all the ξi
to be equal in both decision domains. Both restrictions are rejected by their corresponding
likelihood ratio tests in all three samples with p-values close to zero. Therefore we control for
all three types of heteroscedasticity in the estimation procedure.
Having discussed all the necessary ingredients we now turn to the specification of the finite
mixture regression model. The basic idea of the mixture model is assigning an individual’s
risk-taking choices to one of C different types of behavior each characterized by a distinct
vector of parameters θc = (αc, βc, γ
′
c, δ
′
c)
′5. We denote the proportions of these different types
in the population by pic. Given our assumptions on the distribution of the error term, the
density of type c can be expressed as
f (cei,G; θc, ξi) =
G∏
g=1
1
σig
φ
(
ceig − cˆeg
σig
)
for the i-th individual, where φ(·) denotes the density of the standard normal distribution.
Since we do not know a priori to which group a certain individual belongs to, the proportions
pic are interpreted as probabilities of group membership. Therefore, each individual density of
type c has to be weighted by its respective mixing proportion pic which, of course, is unknown
and has to be estimated as well. Summing over all C components yields the individual’s
contribution to the model’s likelihood function L. The log likelihood of the finite mixture
regression model is then given by
lnL (Ψ; ce,G) =
N∑
i=1
ln
C∑
c=1
pic f (cei,G; θc, ξi),
where the vector Ψ = (θ′1, . . . , θ
′
C , pi1, . . . , piC−1, ξ1, . . . , ξN)
′ summarizes all the parameters of
the model which need to be estimated.
For estimating the model we use the iterative Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm
which provides an additional feature: By Bayesian updating, the algorithm calculates in
each iteration an individual’s posterior probability τic of belonging to group c. The posterior
5The vectors γc and δc contain the domain-specific parameters for the slope and the elevation of the
probability weighting functions.
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probabilities τic represent a particularly valuable result of the estimation procedure. Not only
do we obtain the probabilities of individual group membership but we also have a method
of judging the quality of the classification at our disposal. If all the τic are either close to
zero or one all the individuals are unambiguously assigned to one specific group. The τic
can be used to calculate a summary measure of ambiguity, such as the average normalized
entropy (El-Gamal and Grether, 1995), in order to gage the extent of dubious assignments
and to discriminate between models with differing numbers of types. If the classification has
been successful we should observe a low measure of entropy. For example, if entropy increases
when the number of different types is increased from two to three, the group assignment of
the individuals is less reliable and the model tends to overfit the data. Therefore, the model
with two types is to be preferred. Thus, the entropy measure enables us to determine the
optimal number of distinct types.
We will briefly illustrate the intuition of the iterative estimation routine: Suppose that
there are several different types of individuals in the population, each characterized by a
distinct set of parameter values. If individual group membership were known, the estimates
for the relative group sizes pic would be the relative number of individuals in the respective
group and the group-specific parameter values θc could be obtained by separately maximizing
the joint density function of the respective group. However, as we cannot observe individual
group membership directly we face an incomplete data problem and the direct maximization
of the model’s likelihood function would be difficult (for details see the Appendix). The EM
algorithm now proceeds iteratively in two steps: First, by Bayesian updating an individual’s
posterior probability τic of belonging to a specific group c is obtained based on the actual fit of
the data. As these τic provide an estimate for unobserved individual group membership, they
can be used in the second step of the iteration to estimate a new set of model parameters. As
Dempster, Laird, and Rubin (1977) have shown, this procedure results in an increase of the
likelihood value in each iteration.
Various problems may be encountered when maximizing the likelihood function of a finite
mixture regression model and, therefore, a customized estimation procedure has to be used
which can adequately deal with these problems. Details of the estimation procedure, written
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in the R environment (R Development Core Team, 2006), are discussed in the Appendix.
4 Results
In the following section we describe observed risk taking behavior and present the results of
the finite mixture regression model. We discuss the quality of the classification procedure
and the number of heterogeneous groups identified in the data. Finally, we characterize the
representative types found in each data set by their behavioral parameters and discuss cross-
cultural differences.
RESULT 1: At the aggregate level, the data exhibit the fourfold pattern of risk attitudes pre-
dicted by CPT, i.e. subjects exhibit risk aversion for high-probability gains and low-probability
losses, and risk seeking for low-probability gains and high-probability losses.
Support. Observed risk taking behavior can be conveniently summarized by relative risk
premia RRP = (ev − ce)/|ev|, where ev denotes the expected value of a lottery’s payoff
and ce stands for its certainty equivalent. RRP > 0 indicates risk aversion, RRP < 0 risk
seeking, and RRP = 0 risk neutrality. In the context of EUT, risk preferences are captured
solely by the curvature of the utility function which in turn determines the sign of the relative
risk premium. Therefore, the sign of RRP should be independent of p, the probability of
the more extreme lottery outcome. In Figures 2 through 4, median risk premia sorted by p
show a systematic relationship between RRP and p, however: In all three data sets subjects’
choices display a fourfold pattern, i.e. they are risk averse for low-probability losses and high-
probability gains, and they are risk seeking for low-probability gains and high-probability
losses. Therefore, at a first glance, average behavior is adequately described by a model such
as CPT rather than EUT.
The median RRP s gloss over an important feature of the data, however: There is sub-
stantial latent heterogeneity in risk taking behavior which is uncovered by the finite mixture
regression.
RESULT 2: The heterogeneity of individuals’ risk preferences can be captured by two dis-
tinct types of behavior. Assuming three distinct types yields an inferior characterization of the
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Figure 2: Median Relative Risk Premia Zurich 2003
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Figure 3: Median Relative Risk Premia Zurich 2006
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Figure 4: Median Relative Risk Premia Beijing 2005
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underlying heterogeneity.
Support. The finite mixture regression model classifies individuals according to a given
number of types. In order to evaluate the quality of classification, we calculated the average
normalized entropy ANE (El-Gamal and Grether, 1995) defined as
ANE = − 1
N
N∑
i=1
C∑
c=1
τic logC (τic) ,
for C groups and N individuals. Taking logC normalizes the entropy measure to lie within
[0, 1]. If all the τic are equal to zero or one, ANE = 0. In this case, all the individuals
can be perfectly assigned to one group. ANE = 1 reflects maximum entropy, i.e. all the
τic are equal to 1/C. Such a result indicates that group membership is totally ambiguous
and that categorization has failed. If this were the case, the model’s assumption that there
is a specific number of distinct types in the population could be refuted and, thus, using a
finite mixture regression model would be inappropriate. The first line in Table 3 displays the
average normalized entropy for two groups. All three data sets exhibit an average entropy of
less than 5% of the maximal entropy of one which is an extremely low degree of ambiguity by
any standard. In their experiment on Bayesian learning, for instance, El-Gamal and Grether
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(1995) find the average entropy to lie between 0.11 and 0.38 which they interpret to be “quite
small”.
These low values of ANE in our analysis indicate that nearly all the individuals can be
unambiguously assigned to one of the two groups. This result can also be inferred from the
distributions of the posterior probabilities of group assignment in Figure 5. In Figure 5 τEUT
denotes the posterior probability of belonging to the first group which can be characterized,
as we will demonstrate below, as expected utility maximizers. In all three data sets, the
individuals’ posterior probability of being an expected utility maximizer is either close to
one or close to zero for practically all the individuals. Our result is quite remarkable as
it substantiates that there are two distinct types in the population and not a continuity of
heterogeneous individuals. And it also shows that the underlying behavioral model provides
a sound basis of discriminating between types.
Given the extremely low degree of ambiguity in our two-group classification, an improve-
ment in entropy when three groups are assumed seems hardly possible. If the classification
procedure worked better for three groups than for two groups, the average normalized entropy
should be smaller for C = 3 than for C = 2. Table 3 shows that this is not the case in any of
the three data sets. So we can safely conclude that two groups are sufficient to capture the
essential characteristics of individual heterogeneity in risk taking behavior.
Table 3: Average Normalized Entropy
Groups Zurich 03 Zurich 06 Beijing 05
C = 2 0.049 0.033 0.031
C = 3 0.052 0.034 0.049
Aside from the high reliability of assignment, we also find stable mixing proportions across
all three data sets as the next result shows.
RESULT 3: The proportions of the two distinct types are essentially equal in all three data
sets and amount to a ratio of approximately 20:80.
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Figure 5: Distribution of Posterior Probability of Assignment to EUT
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Support. In all three graphs of Figure 5, there are about four times as many individuals
with τEUT close to zero as individuals with τEUT close to one. This finding is mirrored by the
estimates of the mixing proportions pic. Table 4 displays, for each data set, the group-specific
parameter estimates of the finite mixture regression model and their standard errors obtained
by the bootstrap method with 4, 000 replications (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). Estimates of
the mixing proportion of the first group amount to about 20% and, consequently, to about
80% for the second group. Moreover, the 95%-confidence intervals for the estimates of pic for
all three data sets overlap. Therefore, the classification is not only unambiguous but also
results in roughly equal proportions of both types across our data sets.
This finding leads us to the next question. Can each of the two types found be characterized
by essentially the same patterns of behavior across all three data sets?
RESULT 4: One type of individual behavior, applying to approximately 20% of the subjects,
is characterized by near linear probability weighting and linear valuation of monetary outcomes.
Thus, these individuals behave in accordance with expected value maximization.
Support. As far as the first type is concerned, which comprises about 20% of the subjects,
Table 4 displays almost identical parameter estimates across all three data sets. Without
having imposed any restrictions on the parameters, we find that the first groups’ probability
weighting functions are roughly linear as the parameter estimates for both γ and δ are close to
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Table 4: Classification of Behavior
EUT-Types CPT-Types
Parameters Zurich 03 Zurich 06 Beijing 05 Zurich 03 Zurich 06 Beijing 05
Proportion pi 0.176 0.224 0.201 0.824 0.776 0.799
(0.022) (0.026) (0.020) (0.022) (0.026) (0.020)
Gains
α 0.983 0.989 1.083 1.056 0.901 0.379
(0.012) (0.018) (0.103) (0.021) (0.026) (0.105)
γ 0.952 0.945 0.911 0.414 0.425 0.242
(0.014) (0.020) (0.034) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
δ 0.907 0.909 0.889 0.846 0.862 1.335
(0.012) (0.019) (0.054) (0.021) (0.028) (0.074)
Losses
β 1.009 1.014 1.020 1.108 1.121 1.156
(0.017) (0.024) (0.087) (0.027) (0.047) (0.108)
γ 0.871 0.953 0.948 0.417 0.452 0.306
(0.042) (0.020) (0.040) (0.016) (0.014) (0.013)
δ 0.966 1.049 1.066 1.021 1.060 0.925
(0.059) (0.033) (0.066) (0.027) (0.044) (0.054)
lnL 20,493 11,336 10,244
Parameters 375 249 319
Observations 9,005 4,669 4,281
Standard errors (in parentheses) are based on the bootstrap method with 4,000 replications.
Parameters include additional estimates for ξˆi for domain- and individual-specific error variances.
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Figure 6: Probability Weighting Functions Zurich 2003
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Probability Weights: Loss−Domain
p
w
(p)
EUT−Types
CPT−Types
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Probability Weights: Gain−Domain
p
w
(p)
EUT−Types
CPT−Types
Figure 7: Probability Weighting Functions Zurich 2006
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Figure 8: Probability Weighting Functions Beijing 2005
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one and, in many of the cases, cannot be statistically distinguished from one. The confidence
bands for the probability weighting functions reveal the same picture: Figures 6, 7, and 8
contain the graphs of the domain-specific probability weighting functions by type with their
confidence bands based on the percentile bootstrap method. The gray dotted lines correspond
to the estimated curves for the first type, referred to as “EUT-type”, the gray dashed lines
delimit the respective confidence bands. For both gains and losses, the confidence bands for
the first type include linear weighting over a wide range of probabilities. Moreover, as Table 4
reveals, the estimates for the power functional parameters α and β are also practically equal
to one, so these groups can be essentially characterized as expected value maximizers. In the
light of Rabin’s calibration theorem, we label the individuals belonging to these groups as
“EUT-types”.
The discriminatory power of our classification can also be traced at the behavioral level.
After assigning the subjects to one of the two groups based on their τic, the observed relative
risk premia can be broken down by type as depicted in Figure 9 for the Chinese data set. As
can be seen, the RRP s of the Chinese EUT-types are close to zero, reflecting near risk neutral
behavior in accordance with expected value maximization. A similar picture can be shown to
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emerge for the Zurich 2003 and Zurich 2006 experiments.
The next result characterizes the second group of individuals. The observed fourfold
pattern of risk attitudes, depicted in Figures 2 through 4, already suggests that nonlinear
probability weighting is a dominant feature of aggregate behavior.
RESULT 5: The second type of individuals, comprising about 80% of the subjects, exhibit
an inverted S-shaped probability weighting curve consistent with CPT.
Support. The second, much larger, class of individuals in each data set is characterized
by a typical inverted S-shaped probability weighting function. Consequently, we label these
individuals as “CPT-types”. The CPT-types’ probability weighting curves are pictured as
black lines in Figures 6, 7, and 8. The solid lines correspond to the estimated curves and
the dashed lines mark the confidence bands. For both gains and losses, all three figures show
nonlinear probability weighting curves. Examining the behavior of the Chinese CPT-types at
the level of observed relative risk premia in Figure 9, we find a pronounced fourfold pattern
of risk attitudes with more extreme deviations from risk neutrality than the aggregate risk
premia in Figure 4. As before, a similar picture can be shown to emerge for the Zurich 2003
and Zurich 2006 data. This finding demonstrates that aggregate data underestimate the true
extent of the CPT-types’ probability distortions.
Across all three data sets we found a surprisingly similarity of behavior of the first group,
the EUT-types. Is the second groups’ behavior also devoid of cultural specificities?
RESULT 6: A cross-cultural difference in the CPT-types’ behavior is manifest in the gain-
domain whereas in the loss domain parameter estimates exhibit consistent magnitudes across
all three data sets. For gains, the Chinese subjects weight probabilities more optimistically
than the Swiss subjects. Moreover, they exhibit a clearly concave value function whereas the
Swiss value functions are near linear.
Support. Inspection of the parameter estimates in Table 4 reveals the values for the loss
domain to be essentially of the same order of magnitude across all three data sets: All the
estimates for the curvature parameter β are close to 1.1, the estimated slope parameter γ of
the probability weighting function lies between 0.31 and 0.45, and the elevation parameter
estimates are in the vicinity of 1. The graphs of the CPT-types’ probability weighting functions
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Figure 9: Median Relative Risk Premia by Type Beijing 2005
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over losses all look similar when comparing Figures 6, 7, and 8. We find a substantial cultural
difference between Swiss and Chinese subjects in the gain domain, however. As the graphs
show, the Swiss probability weighting functions in Figures 6 and 7 exhibit the familiar shape,
i.e. intersection with the diagonal at probabilities of about 0.4, whereas the Chinese curve in
Figure 8 is much more elevated. When judging gains, the Chinese subjects seem to be much
more optimistic than the Swiss, i.e. they put a much higher weight on small and medium
probabilities. The Chinese probability weighting function is also considerably flatter in the
middle part than the Swiss curves which indicates a lower sensitivity towards changes in
probabilities by the Chinese. On the other hand, the Chinese value function is clearly concave
(estimated α equals 0.38), contrasting with the almost linear Swiss value functions (estimated
α equals 1.06 and 0.90, respectively).
5 Concluding Remarks
We conducted three experiments based on the same design principles and applied a finite
mixture regression model to the resulting data. For all three data sets a coherent picture
emerges. Irrespective of cultural background, we find an equal mix of two distinct groups.
The classification procedure performs extremely well resulting in less than 5% of the maximal
average normalized entropy which means that almost all the individuals are reliably assigned
to either one of the two distinct groups. The first group comprises about 20% of the subjects,
be they Swiss or Chinese, whose behavior can be characterized by expected utility theory.
Moreover, parameter estimates are almost identical for all three EUT-groups and correspond
to near risk neutral behavior in line with the prediction of Rabin’s calibration theorem.
The second group, encompassing 80% of the subjects, can be classified as prospect theory
types exhibiting an inverted S-shaped probability weighting function. When potential losses
are at stake, the behavior of CPT-types can be described by remarkably similar parameter
values. In the domain of gains, however, we find significant cross-cultural differences. Chinese
risk taking behavior can be explained by two countervailing forces: While probabilities are
weighted highly optimistically, the marginal value of monetary outcomes declines. The risk
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attitude of the Swiss subjects, however, manifests itself mostly in the shape of the probability
weighting function alone. When we estimate risk premia over a comparable range of outcomes,
we predict the Chinese to be more risk seeking than the Swiss for gains of low and medium
probability. Previous studies show that Chinese respondents are relatively more risk seeking
than American respondents (Hsee and Weber, 1999; Wang and Fischbeck, 2004). These results
are consistent with our estimates and can be explained predominantly by the specific shape
of the Chinese probability weighting function.
When we started this project we were quite confident that we would find a considerable
fraction of rational expected utility maximizers. What really surprised us is the robust share
of EUT-types, even across two so different cultures as the Swiss and Chinese. This consistent
magnitude of the EUT-groups lends support to prior evidence by Hey and Orme (1994) and
Lattimore, Baker, and Witte (1992). These rational actors constitute a non-negligible propor-
tion of the population whose behavior, depending on the nature of the strategic environment,
may be decisive for aggregate outcomes. The existence of a robust share of rational actors
suggests to use a mix of preference theories for modeling behavior rather than a single the-
ory which would yield systematically biased results. Moreover, for the majority of subjects,
prospect theory adequately describes behavior, but the parameter estimates exhibit culture-
specific values. Researchers should take this evidence into account when constructing and
estimating models of choice under risk.
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A Estimation of the Finite Mixture Regression Model
As it is generally the case in finite mixture models, direct maximization of the log likelihood
function
lnL (Ψ; ce,G) =
N∑
i=1
ln
C∑
c=1
pic f (cei,G; θc, ξi)
may encounter several problems, even if it is in principle feasible (for a general treatise see for
example McLachlan and Peel (2000)). First, the highly non-linear form of the log likelihood
causes the optimization algorithm to be rather slow or even incapable of finding the maximum.
Second, the likelihood of a finite mixture model is often multimodal and therefore we have
no guaranty that a standard optimization routine will converge towards the global maximum
rather than to one of the local maxima.
However, if individual group-membership were observable and indicated by tic ∈ {0, 1} the
individual contribution to the likelihood function would be given by
˜`(Ψi; cei,G, ti) =
C∏
c=1
[pic f (cei,G; θc, ξi)]tic
By using the above formulation and taking logarithms, the complete-data log likelihood func-
tion
ln L˜ (Ψ; ce,G, t) =
N∑
i=1
C∑
c=1
tic [ln pic + ln f (cei,G; θc, ξi)]
would follow directly. As relative group sizes sum up to one, their maximum likelihood esti-
mates, pˆic = 1/N
∑N
i=1 tic, would be given analytically by the relative number of individuals
in the respective group. Furthermore, the maximum likelihood estimates of the group-specific
parameters could be obtained separately in each group by numerically maximizing the corre-
sponding joint density function which would simplify the optimization problem considerably.
The EM algorithm proceeds iteratively in two steps, E and M, while it treats the unob-
servable tic as missing data. In the E-step of the (k + 1)-th iteration the expectation of the
complete-data log likelihood L˜, given the actual fit of the data Ψ(k), is computed. This yields,
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according to Bayes’ law, the posterior probabilities of individual group-membership
τic
(
cei,G; Ψ(k)i
)
=
pi
(k)
c f
(
cei,G; θ(k)c , ξ(k)i
)
∑C
m=1 pi
(k)
m f
(
cei,G; θ(k)m , ξ(k)i
)
which replace the unknown indicators of individual group-membership, tic. Given τic
(
cei,G; Ψ(k)i
)
,
the complete-data log likelihood, L˜, is maximized in the following M-step which yields the
updates of the model parameters,
pi(k+1)c =
1
N
N∑
i=1
τic
(
cei,G; Ψ(k)i
)
,
and (
θ
(k+1)
1 , . . . , θ
(k+1)
C , ξ
(k+1)
1 , . . . , ξ
(k+1)
N
)
=
argmax
θ1,...,θC ,ξ1,...,ξN
N∑
i=1
C∑
m=1
τim
(
cei,G; Ψ(k)i
)
ln f
(
cei,G; θ(k)m , ξ(k)i
)
.
As Dempster, Laird, and Rubin (1977) show, the likelihood never decreases from one iteration
to the next, i.e. L
(
Ψ(k+1); ce,G) ≥ L (Ψ(k); ce,G), which makes the EM algorithm converge
monotonically towards the nearest maximum of the likelihood function regardless whether this
maximum is global or just local. In the Zurich 2003 data set, we therefore needed to apply a
stochastic extension, the Simulated Annealing Expectation Maximization (SAEM) algorithm
proposed by Celeux, Chauveau, and Diebolt (1995), in order to overcome the EM algorithm’s
tendency to converge towards local maxima. In each iteration, there is a non-zero probability
that the SAEM algorithm leaves the current optimization path and starts over in a different
region of the likelihood function which results in much higher chances of finding the global
maximum. But this robustness against multimodality of the objective function comes at the
cost of much higher computational demands.
As the EM algorithm is computationally highly demanding, even in its basic form, and
tends to become tediously slow when close to convergence our estimation routine relies on
a hybrid estimation algorithm (Render and Walker, 1984): It first uses either the EM or
the SAEM algorithm and takes advantage of their robustness before it switches to the direct
28
maximization of the log likelihood by the much faster BFGS algorithm. The estimation routine
in this form turned out to be efficient and robust as it reliably converged towards the same
maximum likelihood estimates regardless of the randomly chosen start values.
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